We examine the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality. We identify manager-specific effects by creating a measure of managerial ability using frontier analysis and separating manager-specific from firm-specific effects by following managers across firms. We find that earnings quality, measured by the extent that accruals map into cash flows, is increasing with managerial ability. This finding is consistent with the premise that more capable managers are better able to estimate accruals. * We would like to thank Venky Nagar, Larry Seiford, Ram Venkataraman (AAA discussant), and workshop participants at the 2006 AAA annual meeting, the University of California-Berkeley, and the University of Indiana for their comments and suggestions.
Introduction
We examine the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality. We anticipate that superior managers will report higher quality accruals, all else equal, as they are more knowledgeable of their business and therefore are better able to estimate accruals. While the empirical literature in the area of earnings quality has largely focused on firm-specific characteristics, such as size and board independence (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Klein, 2002) , we examine manager-specific effects by creating a measure of managerial ability using frontier analysis (e.g., Leverty and Grace, 2005) . We further distinguish manager-specific from firmspecific effects by following managers (specifically CFOs) across firms. Our study is in the vein of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who find that managers have an effect on firm choices, such as acquisitions or research and development expenditures, and Francis et al. (2006) who document that earnings quality varies inversely with CEO reputation. 1 We find that earnings quality, measured by the extent that accruals map into cash flows, is increasing with managerial ability; this relation holds after including controls for innate characteristics of firms that make it more or less difficult to estimate accruals (e.g., operating cycle and sales volatility) as well as structural characteristics shown to affect the quality of earnings (e.g., board independence and internal control quality). This finding is consistent with the premise that capable managers are better able to estimate accruals resulting in a more precise measure of earnings. We also consider two additional earnings quality measures: earnings persistence and a reduced frequency of restatements. These results also support the notion that more able managers produce higher quality earnings.
1 Francis et al. (2006) measure CEO reputation with the number of articles mentioning the executive. They find that the number of news articles pertaining to the company's CEO and earnings quality are negatively associated.
Our managerial ability measure is generated using Data Envelopment Analysis (or frontier analysis), which assigns an efficiency score to each firm based on a vector of inputs (e.g., capital and expenses) and outputs (e.g., revenue) of the company. We thus estimate the relative efficiencies of firms in an industry and attribute these efficiencies to managerial ability.
We find that this efficiency score is positively associated with earnings quality, after controlling for known determinants of earnings quality, such as firm size, cash flow volatility, and operating cycle, and structural choices, such as board independence. We then triangulate our results to verify that the efficiency score measures managerial ability rather than simply firm-specific effects. For a sub-sample of our firms where we can track a manager across two firms, we include both firm-specific and manager-specific indicator variables, interacted with the efficiency score. We find that, after controlling for firm-specific effects, manager-specific efficiency continues to be associated with earnings quality.
This paper is the first to examine the relation between earnings quality and managerial ability. We examine a multi-dimensional measure of relative efficiency, and find that superior managers report higher quality earnings. This finding contributes to both the earnings quality literature and the managerial accounting literature. Although past anecdotal evidence suggests that firms choose managers who can most efficiently operate the firm, these results apply a new measure of managerial efficiency and find corroborating evidence.
In the next section, we develop our hypotheses with a review of the literature. Section 3 describes our managerial ability measure, obtained using Data Envelopment Analysis. In Section 4, we describe our sample, test variables, and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results and the final section concludes the study.
Prior Research and Hypothesis Development
To date, the bulk of the literature on earnings quality has examined firm-specific characteristics. Dechow and Dichev (2002) define higher earnings quality to be when more accruals are realized as cash (described in detail in Section 4.2.1). They document that earnings quality is poorer for firms that are smaller, are experiencing losses, have greater sales and cash flow volatility, and have longer operating cycles. Each of these innate characteristics makes accruals more difficult to estimate.
In addition to these innate characteristics, earnings quality has been found to vary with firm infrastructure. Klein (2002) finds that firms with more independent board members have higher quality accruals, consistent with stronger governance constraining earnings management.
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Doyle et al. (2006) find that earnings quality is poorer in firms that have weaker internal controls over financial reporting, where it is less likely that errors or intentional misstatements are discovered and corrected.
However, only Francis et al. (2006) examine whether earnings quality varies with managerial characteristics. Their study examines the relation between earnings quality and CEO reputation, measured by the number of business press articles mentioning each CEO. The authors conduct their analysis for a sample of about 2,000 firm-year observations from the S&P 500 over 1992-2001 and find a negative relation between CEO reputation and earnings quality.
They conclude "boards of directors hire specific managers due to the reputation and expertise these individuals bring to managing the more complex and volatile operating environments of these firms." In other words, it is the volatile operating environments or other innate characteristics of the firm causing the lower earnings quality, not managerial actions.
In support of manager-specific effects, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that managers have a real impact on the firms they manage-that firm decision-making reflects the "style" of different managers. They follow managers in the Forbes 800 files, from 1969-1999.
As they examine an array of decisions, they follow CEOs, CFOs and COOs. Their final sample has about 600 firms and just over 500 individuals. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that these managers have an impact on the choices made by the firm as a whole. In a similar vein, Richardson et al. (2004) examine board member tastes using a sample of 885 firms with common directors in 1999. They find that board member fixed effects are associated with firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policy choices.
Finally, in the insurance industry, Leverty and Grace (2005) ask whether managerial ability reduces the likelihood of insurer distress or influences the amount of time spent under distress. To measure managerial ability, they use DEA frontier efficiency and characterize superior managers as those that use inputs efficiently in the production process.
We follow Leverty and Grace (2005) and use DEA to estimate managerial ability. In our "switching firms" subsample, we examine CFOs, as we expect these managers' abilities to have the greatest effect on the estimation of accruals. As noted in Bertrand and Schoar (2003, p. 1181), different types of managers matter for different decisions, and CFOs matter more for financial decisions.
Accruals are managerial estimates intended to provide a better forecast of performance than cash flows (Dechow, 1994) . Improved estimation of accruals results in higher quality earnings. In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial ability on earnings quality. We posit that the more able a manager, the higher the quality of her estimations of accruals, as she knows more about her business. This leads to our hypothesis (stated in the null form):
H1: Earnings quality is not associated with managerial ability.
We refer to the mapping of accruals into cash flows when describing earnings quality (following Dechow and Dichev, 2002) . Essentially, if an accrual never results in cash, that accrual is of poor quality. This measure is not a direct measure of earnings management, but rather is intended to capture both errors and accruals management reversals (as these accruals were erroneous by construction). To the extent that managers manage earnings to signal their knowledge, the accruals should become cash flows, and this earnings management is not expected to negatively impact our earnings quality measure, as cash flows will be realized.
Data Envelopment Analysis
We use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to garner a measure of managerial ability.
DEA is a statistical procedure used to evaluate the relative efficiency of entities. 2 DEA is an improvement over traditional efficiency analysis because, rather than be constrained to a single input and output (e.g., sales / assets), DEA allows for a vector of inputs and outputs to be considered (e.g., [product sales and service sales] / [labor expense, raw materials, and advertising expense]. While traditional efficiency could consider multiple variables, explicit weights would have to be given to each variable (e.g., perhaps labor expense is weighted more heavily than advertising expense, or all three inputs would be equally weighted). Users of DEA do not have to determine and apply explicit weights to the variables. DEA infers implicit weights on each of the inputs and outputs. We provide a more comprehensive discussion of DEA in the appendix.
2 See the appendix for a more comprehensive discussion of DEA. DEA has developed rapidly over the past three decades, originating with Charnes et al. (1978) who used the technique to evaluate operational efficiency with physical inputs and outputs. Management accounting research has also incorporated DEA applications; Callen (1991) provides a review. Topics include cost/variance analysis (Marcinko and Petri, 1984; Barlev and Callen, 1986) and performance measurement (Rouse et al., 2002) .
In our study we expect that within an industry, managerial ability has a distinguishable effect on the efficiency of the firm (how close they are able to come to the frontier). The principal output of a firm is revenue; therefore, the single output we evaluate using DEA is revenue. 3 As inputs, we consider items that contribute to the production of revenue. The first is cost of goods sold (COGS; data item #41); this includes labor and material costs. A second potential input is selling, general, and administrative costs (SG&A; data item #189). SG&A indirectly impacts the production of revenue-it includes management compensation, main office expenses, and other costs that exist to support the production of revenue. We include these costs for two reasons. First, they comprise a large component of the cost structure for most firms in our sample. Second, while indirectly related to revenue production, it is difficult to imagine producing revenue as effectively without them.
In addition to requiring labor, materials, and administrative expenditures, many firms in our sample make large investments in capitalizable property, plant, and equipment. We expect that managerial ability can affect the choice to invest and therefore include net property, plant and equipment (PP&E, data item #8) in our input vector. Ceteris paribus, a firm is more efficient if it can produce the same amount of revenue with a smaller investment in capital. We use net PP&E to be consistent with capitalized leases and psuedo-capitalized R&D, which are both presented on a net basis, described below.
Ge (2006) shows that off-balance sheet assets, like assets recognized on the balance sheet, impact the profitability of the firm. We include future operating lease obligations to capture the impact of off-balance sheet assets. Data is available for lease payments for five years; "capitalized leases" is calculated as the discounted present value of those future payments. 4 We next extend our vector to include certain intangible investments. The first is research and development expenditures (R&D). Lev and Sougiannis (1996) show that investments in R&D impact firm earnings. While the earnings related to R&D are realized over time, GAAP requires the immediate expensing of R&D. We follow Lev and Sougiannis (1996) who describe how to "capitalize" R&D expenditures, and use a five-year capitalization of R&D expense (data item #46), where the capitalized value is
. In other words, the R&D expenditure from four years earlier receives weight of .2, three years a weight of .4, etc., with the current year's R&D (t=0) receiving full weight. 5 We refer to this capitalization of R&D as "pseudo-capitalized R&D" to distinguish this variable from intangibles that are allowed to be capitalized under GAAP.
The second intangible investment included in our vector is goodwill, the premium paid over the fair value of an acquisition (data item #204). The idea behind goodwill is that the purchase of another company results in value, either through synergies or unrecorded value such as firm reputation. The third and final intangible input is other acquired and capitalized intangibles (data item #33 -data item #204). These intangibles include such items as copyrights and patents. In general, we expect investments in intangible assets to have varying returns, which may vary with managerial ability. Our second sample is a subset of the full sample where each firm must have had at least one change in the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) from 1992-2001. In addition, the CFO that switched firms must appear in another sample firm during the sample period, in order to examine manager-specific effects (in a similar vein to the sample in Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) . We track managers across firms using their executive identifiers in Execucomp. This "CFO Switching" sample consists of 3,678 firm-year observations from 489 firms and 274 managers.
Variable Definitions

Earnings Quality
The focus of this paper is on the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality.
We measure earnings quality following Dechow and Dichev (2002) who posit that a high quality accrual is eventually realized as cash flows. Accruals that are made due to errors in estimation or earnings management will not be realized as cash flows. We use this measure as our measure of earnings quality as we hypothesize that the better a manager knows their business, the better able they are to operate efficiently, and also the less likely they are to have erroneous accruals. We determine how well a firm's accruals map into cash flows by first estimating the following regression by industry.
The residuals from the regression measure the extent to which current accruals ( WC) do not effectively map into past, present, or future cash flows (CFO). 8 Dechow and Dichev (2002) estimate a similar regression by firm, and use the standard deviation of these firm-specific residuals as their measure of earnings quality, where a higher standard deviation denotes lower earnings quality. However, estimating a firm-specific regression requires nine years of data, and therefore we estimate the regressions in the cross-section, following Francis et al. (2005), which is less data intensive, requiring six years of data to generate four cross-sectional residuals.
Following both McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) , we also include the current year change in sales ( REV = change in data item #12) and the current year gross level of property, plant, and equipment (PPE = data item #7) in equation (1). We estimate the regressions by year and industry, where industries are defined using the Fama and French (1997) industry classifications. If an industry group has less than 20 observations in any given year, those observations are deleted. The standard deviation of these residuals speaks to the level of earnings quality-the higher the standard deviation, the lower the quality. We aggregate the 8 We define the change in working capital accruals from year t-1 to t as WC = Accounts Receivable + Inventory -Accounts Payable -Taxes Payable + Other Assets, or WC = -(data item 302 + data item 303 + data item 304 + data item 305 + data item 307). CFO is cash flow from operations (data item 308). We use information from the statement of cash flows, rather than the balance sheet, to estimate current accruals because the balance sheet approach can lead to noisy estimates (Hribar and Collins, 2002) . All variables in equation (1) are scaled by average total assets (data item 6) and winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles, by year.
standard deviations in four year rolling increments. We multiply the standard deviation by negative one to present a statistic that increases with earnings quality.
Additional Earnings Quality Measures
We calculate two additional earnings quality measures. The first is the existence of a restatement, where restatements represent poor quality earnings. We obtain restatement information from the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO compiled a list of firms that announced restatements from 1997-2002.
We also calculate earnings persistence. Following the literature, we calculate earnings as earnings before extraordinary items (data item #123) scaled by average total assets (data item #6) and estimate the following regression, where the coefficient β 1 is earnings persistence:
Control Variables
Our first set of control variables encompasses those determinants of earnings quality noted in Dechow and Dichev (2002): firm size, proportion of losses, sales volatility, cash flow volatility, and operating cycle. Firm Size is the log of total assets in year t (data item #6), Loss
Proportion is the ratio of the number of years of losses (data item #123) in each four year aggregation period, Sales Volatility is the standard deviation of the change in sales (data item 
Descriptive Statistics
We present descriptive statistics in Table 1 . Efficiency scores are, on average, 61.9%, with a maximum of 1.00 (the frontier) and a minimum of 0.0003 (not tabulated). Mean earnings quality is -0.052, similar to that in Francis et al. (2005) [recall that we have multiplied the standard deviation by negative one]. Our control variables are consistent with those in the literature. For example, the average firm's assets is $1,712 million, with an average operating cycle of 138 days.
We present a correlation matrix in Table 2 . Efficiency is positively correlated with earnings quality and negatively correlated with the existence of a restatement, providing initial support for our hypothesis. It is important to note that efficiency and return on assets are positively correlated, however the correlation is only 0.38, thus, the managerial ability measure captures more than just reported performance. As in the prior literature, earnings quality is increasing in firm size and decreasing in losses, volatility, and the length of the firm's operating cycle (Dechow and Dichev, 2002 ). Earnings quality is also increasing in board independence (Klein, 2002) and decreasing with internal control problems (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Doyle et al., 2006) .
Validity of the Efficiency Construct
The main analysis focuses on the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality: we predict that relatively more able managers will have higher quality earnings than relatively less able managers. However, the entire paper hinges on our measure of managerial ability. In this section, we attempt to validate our measure. First, if our measure of managerial ability is valid, we expect it to vary systematically with certain measures, such as managerial compensation, managerial expertise, and managerial education. While we do not have data on expertise or education, we examine herein the association between managerial compensation and our efficiency measure. We expect more talented managers to be more highly compensated and estimate the following regression:
Compensation is the year-over-year percentage change in total compensation, including bonus and option grants (Execucomp TDC1_PCT). Efficiency is the DEA efficiency measure, which ranges from zero (completely inefficient) to one (optimally efficient; on the frontier). We include three control variables: ROA is earnings before extraordinary items (data item #123) scaled by total assets, Returns is the compounded annual stock returns (from CRSP using monthly data) for the year up to and including the fiscal year-end of the observation, and Firm
Size is the book value of assets (data item #6). Each of these control variables has been shown to be associated with compensation (e.g., Murphy, 1999) . We predict the coefficient on efficiency to be positive and significant.
Results are presented in Table 3 . Consistent with our efficiency measure capturing some facet of managerial ability, more able managers are paid more, after controlling for current period performance measured using both earnings and returns.
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We present a second validity test by examining future earnings. We expect more efficient managers to produce higher earnings in the future, holding current profitability constant.
To examine this, we estimate the following regression: If more able managers produce higher earnings, after controlling for current profitability, we expect β 1 to be positive and significant. We control for earnings volatility measures in addition to current performance because current earnings may be noisier for firms with more volatile operations, and it is possible that firms with more volatility are more likely to hire quality managers (e.g., Francis et al., 2006) . Turning to the second column of results in Table 3 , results are as predicted, more able managers have higher earnings in the following year, after controlling for current period performance.
Our third and final validity test examines our managerial efficiency measure directly using our CFO Switching sample. If we follow a manager across firms, we expect the efficiency measure to be correlated with the manager. We test this expectation by estimating the following equation:
Managerial Indicator is an indicator variable that is equal to one if manager k was the CFO in firm j in year t and zero otherwise. A manager's ability can be good or bad, as such, if efficiency is at least in part a managerial attribute we expect α to be significantly different from zero in either direction. Of the 274 executive-specific coefficient estimates, 58 (21 percent) are statistically significant at p < 0.10. In contrast, of the 489 firm-specific coefficient estimates, 143 (29 percent) are statistically significant at p < 0.10. Therefore, while the efficiency measure clearly cannot be fully attributable to managerial actions, overall, our measure of managerial ability does appear to be, at least in part, measuring the underlying construct of managerial ability. Using our estimate of managerial ability, more able managers are paid more than less able managers and produce higher future earnings than less able managers, and our measure of managerial ability spans firms for a subset of managers that switched firms during our sample period.
Test Design and Results
Test of H1
To determine whether managerial ability varies with earnings quality, we first estimate the following regression: Because our dependent variable is measured over four years, the dependent variable overlaps between observations. To control for this overlap we estimate equation (6) separately for each year and report the mean of the resulting coefficient estimates. We then compute a t-statistic based on the annual estimates (similar to Fama and MacBeth, 1973) , multiplying the traditional standard error by the Newey-West adjustment (Newey and West, 1987) to account for possible serial correlation in the annual estimates. 11 We present the estimates in Table 4 . In the first column of results, we include only the determinants of earnings quality as control variables.
Consistent with our hypothesis, earnings quality is increasing in managerial ability (β 1 = 0.003, tstatistic = 2.93).
Our findings are similar in the remaining specifications. In the second column of estimates, we include the decile rank of board independence as a control variable. As in Klein ( 1 ρ . The variable ρ i is the autocorrelation at lag i and n is the number of lags that are expected to be autocorrelated. We set n equal to the number of overlapping periods in each test (i.e., n=4). internal control and results are similar to existing studies: poor internal control quality is associated with poorer earnings quality. Finally, in the last column of estimates we include all of our control variables, for the reduced sample for firms with board independence data. Results continue to weakly support our hypothesis, even with our limited sample of only 4,768 firm-year observations comprised of only six annual regressions.
The economic impact of managerial ability on earnings quality appears to be economically significant. Recall that Efficiency Score is the decile rank. Therefore, as a manager moves from the bottom to the top ability decile, earnings quality is expected to improve by about 5. 
Manager-Specific Analysis
While we control for many firm-specific variables in the above regressions, we go one step further to validate our findings and turn to our limited sample to abstract away from firmspecific effects, focusing instead on manager-specific effects. As noted above, we have created a sample that tracks CFOs over time. The sample begins with all observations from Execucomp where the executive title is related to the financial reporting or financial management function of the firm. 14 We then determine which of these executives switched between two firms in the sample period, thereby allowing us to focus on the manager, separate from the firm. In total, there are 274 executive switches between 489 firms, for a total of 3,678 firm-years of data.
This switch sample allows us to isolate manager-specific effects from firm-specific effects. We create an indicator variable for each of the CFO identifiers in Execucomp that is present in more than one firm from 1992-2005. We also create an indicator variable for each firm in our limited sample. We then replace the single vector of efficiency scores with 763 vectors of the efficiency score, denoted as follows: 
If the manager-specific interactions are significantly different from zero, after controlling for the firm-specific interactions, this indicates that the managers themselves are driving some of the association between earnings quality and the efficiency score. We test this association following
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), using an F-test with the null that each the manager-specific variables are equal to zero. We are able to reject the null with a p-value < 0.0001. This indicates that at least some facet of our efficiency measure is manager-specific. Specifically, approximately 19.5 percent of the manager-specific coefficients were significant at p-value < 0.10. Interestingly, only 15.8 percent of the firm-specific coefficients were significant at p-value < 0.10.
Additional Earnings Quality Proxies
While we provide evidence that managerial ability affects earnings quality, our earnings quality measure is measured over four years (requiring a total of six years of data) and also faces some criticism (Wyscoki, 2005; Hribar and Nichols, 2006) . Therefore, we consider two additional measures of earnings quality. The first measure is the announcement of a restatement of earnings, where a restatement is taken as de facto evidence of poor earnings quality. We obtain the restatement data from the GAO website limiting this estimation to the years 1997-2001. We estimate the following equation using a pooled probit regression:
We include two control variables: firm size and firm profitability, both of which have been shown to be associated with restatements (e.g., Kinney and McDaniel, 1989) . In contrast to our main analysis, our dependent variable is not estimated by industry; therefore, we also include industry indicators. Results are presented in Table 5 , Panel A. Consistent with our main findings, managerial ability is associated with higher earnings quality when using the existence of a restatement as evidence of poor earnings quality. The more efficient the manager, the less likely the firm is to restate (β 1 = -0.154; 2 = 2.88); moving from the worst to the best decile of managerial ability is expected to reduce the likelihood of a restatement by 15 percent.
Our second alternative measure is earnings persistence. Generally, higher earnings persistence is considered to be indicative of higher earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003 We estimate equation (9) in two separate groups: those with positive current earnings and those with zero or negative current earnings. For the profit firms, we expect that persistence will be increasing in efficiency, after we control for the main effect of both earnings and efficiency, and for other variables expected to affect the persistence of earnings. For the loss firms, a better manager would be expected to turn the firm around more quickly (e.g., Grace and Leverty, 2005) . Thus, we expect the interaction term to be negative, reflecting the incremental speed of reverting to positive earnings. We present the estimates from our two regressions in Table 5 ,
Referring to the first column of results, consistent with our main finding, persistence is increasing in managerial ability for profit firms. This finding is incremental to the main effect of managerial ability. As described in Section 3, more able managers generate higher future earnings (β 2 = 0.007; t-statistic = 1.74, and Table 3 ). However, their current period earnings are also of higher quality (i.e., are more likely to persist into the future). Persistence is expected to increase from 0.534 to 0.801 (0.534 + 0.267) when moving from the lowest to the highest decile of managerial ability. This higher persistence is clearly economically significant, and supports our hypothesis.
Turning to the final column of results, the coefficient on the main effect of earnings is positive and significant, suggesting that loss firms in general continue to have losses. Next, the coefficient on the main effect of efficiency is not significant, in contrast to the profit sample.
Finally, the interaction term is negative and significant, as expected. In contrast to the profit sample, this finding is more ambiguous with respect to earnings quality; it is not clear that "high quality" losses should revert to profits more rapidly. However, this finding is consistent with efficient managers being more able to turn around their poorly performing firms more quickly (e.g., Leverty and Grace, 2005).
Conclusion
We examine the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality. While empirical literature in the area of earnings quality has largely focused on firm-specific characteristics, such as size and board independence (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Klein, 2002) , we examine manager-specific effects by creating a measure of managerial ability using frontier analysis (e.g., Leverty and Grace, 2005) , and isolating manager-specific effects from firmspecific effects by following managers across firms. Our study is in the vein of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who find that managers have an effect on firm choices such as acquisitions or research and development expenditures and Francis et al. (2005) who find that earnings quality appears to vary with CEO reputation. We find that earnings quality, measured by the extent that accruals map into cash flows, is increasing with managerial ability. This finding is consistent with the premise that the more capable the manager the better they are able to estimate accruals.
We introduce a new measure of managerial ability to the accounting literature. This measure could potentially be used to answer a multitude of managerial-specific questions. For example, do more able managers issue more accurate earnings forecasts? Do they make better merger and acquisition decisions? Do they make better use of SEO proceeds? Are they able to exercise their options at higher values than less able managers? Do they appear to make optimal dividend and share repurchase decisions? Do more able managers require greater governance (as they may be more able to acquire perquisites) or less? Are more able managers more or less likely to manage earnings? Does the market price managerial ability? We leave these questions for future research.
Appendix
A.1. An Overview of Data Envelopment Analysis
Data envelopment analysis (DEA), first introduced in Charnes et al. (1978) , is a statistical procedure used to evaluate the relative efficiency of entities. A common objective of any organization is efficiency: producing the maximum value output for the minimum cost of inputs.
Evaluating the efficiency of an organization, be it a factory, business line, corporation, or country, is important and relevant for decision-making. A number of specific measures have been developed to quantify efficiency. Generally, they take on the form total output value / total input value. The ratio is increasing in the efficiency of the organization. Consider, for example, an asset turnover ratio (sales / assets); the higher the ratio, the more sales are generated for a fixed amount of assets. Given a set of organizations, each of which measures this ratio with the same outputs and inputs, the relative efficiency of the organizations can be evaluated.
DEA expands the numerator (total output value) and denominator (total input value) to a vector of outputs and inputs. Returning to the example of the sales turnover ratio, the input "assets" is comprised of many uniquely identifiable components. The asset turnover ratio restricts each of these components to have an equal weight-PP&E is given the same weight as inventory and intangible assets. A more technical ratio might recognize that a dollar of PP&E is not expected to have the same effect on revenue as a dollar of inventory. However, in the simple world of a single input and a single output, explicit weights must be assigned, and applied to all firms equally. DEA, however, obtains implied weights from each firm observation. Thus, the weights are not subjectively determined by the user and they are also allowed to vary from firm to firm. We describe these implicit weights in greater detail in the following sections. The next section presents the optimization program, followed by a full numerical example of DEA. The final section of the appendix presents discuss of the results of the optimization program.
A.2. The Optimization Program
The following optimization problem yields DEA efficiency. This is the problem as formulated in Charnes et al. (1978) , and is referred to generally as the CCR model: There are n firms in the optimization; equation (A1) is maximized for each of the n firms.
Additionally, there are s different outputs and m different inputs. In the numerator, u i is the implicit weight (as determined by the data) on output unit i; y ik is the amount of output i for firm k. Similarly, v j is the implicit weight of input unit j, and x jk is the amount of input j for firm k.
The objective of the program is to maximize (A1) by choosing the optimal weights u and v. This ratio is the total output value over the total input value. The maximization is constrained by three conditions. First, equation (A2) indicates that the ratio must be no larger than one; this is to ensure that the decision-making unit with the highest efficiency (based on the optimal weights) will be scaled to one. The conditions in (A3) and (A4) ensure that the optimal weights will be non-negative.
The above program is non-linear, due to the fractional term in the objective and first constraint. It can be shown that the following program is equivalent:
The objective of this input-oriented CCR model is to minimize θ , the total value of inputs relative to outputs. The optimal θ is the relative efficiency the firm under study relative to the other firms; this is analogous (A1) where output value is maximized. The λ 's in (A6)- (A8) represent the relative weights on outputs and inputs (i.e. u and v). Condition (A6) and (A7) together are equivalent to (A2) and serve to fix efficiency between 0 and 1. Condition (A8) is equivalent to (A3) and (A4), and constrain the relative weights to be non-negative. 16 While the fractional and linear programs yield equivalent solutions, the linear program is computationally easier. For this reason, DEA efficiency is most often calculated using the linear program.
A.3. The Application of DEA
Returning to our example of the asset turnover ratio, we now expand this ratio to vectors.
While DEA allows for multiple outputs, we continue to only consider sales in our output vector. However, in the denominator (the input vector), we will now consider three asset components:
Inventory, PP&E, and Intangible Assets. Using DEA, we will show how it is determined that both Firm A and B are fully efficient, while Firm C is only 80% efficient relative to its peers. In the remainder of this section, we illustrate how efficiency is calculated for each firm. This is followed by a discussion of optimal weights for each input.
Firm
The following equations are used to calculate the relative efficiency for Firm A: 
A.4. Interpretation of Results
The optimization program for Firm C shows that it is inefficient relative to Firms A and B. The results of the calculation also provide details on the nature of the inefficiency, particularly how Firm C could improve its input/output mix to be efficient. There are three major outputs from the optimization process. The first is efficiency, θ , which has been discussed in detail above. The second is the λ s, which are the relative weights between inputs and outputs for firms in the calculation. The third is the γ s, which are the multipliers from the optimization. These represent the implicit weights on the individual inputs and outputs; in a sense, they are a decomposition of the λ s. The discussion below starts by discussing the interpretation of implicit weights, followed by their relation to the relative weights and their interpretation. Using Firm B's inputs and output, the efficiency can be calculated: 17 In the language of production, there is input slack for PPE. Variables are defined as follows: Compensation is the percentage change in total executive compensation including the Black-Scholes value of option grants (Execucomp data item TDC1_PCT). Future Earnings is the income before extraordinary items (data item #123) scaled by the average total assets (data item #6) for the year following the observation year. For each independent variable, the first column (compensation) uses the change in the variable, while the second column (future earnings) uses the level of the variable. Efficiency Score is the decile rank of the relative efficiency score calculated using DEA by industry; the value ranges from zero to one. Earnings is income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets. Returns are the compounded annual stock returns for the firm for the year of the observation. Industry indicator variables are defined following Fama and French (1997) . Additional variables are defined in Table 1 . Efficiency Score and Board Independence are the decile ranks of the relative efficiency score calculated using DEA by industry, and the percentage of independent board members, respectively. Their values range from zero to one. Data and variable descriptions are provided in Table 1 . Coefficients presented are the mean coefficients from annual regressions. Adjusted t-statistics are generated from the standard deviation of the annual coefficients (Fama MacBeth, 1973) and then adjusted for overlapping periods (Newey and West, 1987) . *, ** Two-tailed p-values < 0.10, 0.01, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Efficiency Score is the decile rank of the relative efficiency score calculated using DEA by industry; the value ranges from zero to one. Restatement is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm was identified by the General Accounting Office as announcing a restatement from 1997-2002 and zero otherwise. Earnings is equal to earnings before extraordinary items (data item #18) scaled by average total assets (data item #6). Future Earnings are earnings for year t+1. Industry indicator variables are defined following Fama and French (1997) . Additional variables are defined in Table 1 . Panel B uses only observations with earnings greater than zero.
